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NOTES
RECIPROCITY: A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST
STANDING?
The ability of a foreign government to maintain a suit for treble
damages under United States antitrust laws remains unclear despite
the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Pfizer v. India.' The Pfizer
Court held that a foreign government is a "person" within the mean-
ing of section four of the Clayton Act,2 and, therefore is capable of
instituting an antitrust action. Since that decision, Congress has
repeatedly attempted to limit the standing of a foreign government
in antitrust suits by imposing a reciprocity requirement3 on section
1. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
2. § 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action for treble damages:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 7 of the Sherman Act first authorized
antitrust actions for treble damages. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). The Sherman Act,
considered the essence of antitrust law in the United States, prescribes the violations
upon which an action under § 4 of the Clayton Act may be based. The Sherman Act
states, in part:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, is declared to be illegal....
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
3. This Note uses the term "reciprocity" in the antitrust context to refer to the impo-
sition of any standing requirements on a foreign government beyond the traditional
requirements: peace with the United States and recognition of the foreign government
by the United States executive branch. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
Reciprocity traditionally has been defined as "the relation existing between two states
when each of them gives the subjects of the other certain privileges at the hands of the
latter state." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1142 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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four.4 The success of such an amendment will have far-reaching
effects on the United States commitment to consumer protection,
world leadership in free trade, and continued friendly relations with
foreign nations.
. This Note takes the first step in assessing the desirability of a
reciprocity requirement. After sketching the background of the reci-
procity issue, the Note analyzes relevant antitrust policy considera-
tions to determine whether they necessitate the imposition of a
reciprocity requirement. Parts III and IV survey foreign antitrust
law, formulate different reciprocity standards, and analyze the prac-
tical effects such standards would have in light of current foreign
antitrust law. The Note concludes that foreign governments should




A. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
Section four of the Clayton Act contemplates two goals: deter-
ring would-be antitrust violators and compensating victims for inju-
ries caused by antitrust violations. In Perma Lffe Muflers, Inc. v.
Int'lParts Cop.,5 the Court stated that the purpose of section four of
4. The most recent attempt to limit the standing of foreign governments was left
pending before the 97th Congress. On July 9, 1981, the Senate passed the Antitrust Reci-
procity Act of 1981. S. 816, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Unlike previously proposed
amendments, S. 816 contains an enforceability requirement. To satisfy the standing
requirements for an antitrust action under this amendment, a foreign nation must outlaw
similar anticompetitive conduct, grant the United States government standing to bring
similar suits, and, in addition, the foreign government must enforce its own antitrust
laws. S. 816 requires "the laws of such foreign government applicable to conduct similar
to the conduct of the person sued under this section [to be] enforced by such foreign
government." Id. § l(b)(2). Further, the foreign government must prohibit such conduct
at the time the suit is brought, and must have outlawed it "during the time the prohibited
conduct [of the would-be defendant] occurred." Id. § l(b)(2). The House counterpart to
S. 816 was considered by the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Monopo-
lies and Commercial Law. H.R. 2812, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). When the Subcom-
mittee reported H.R. 2812 to the full committee on November 20, 1981, an amendment
in the form of a substitute bill, H.R. 5106, was unanimously adopted. H. REP. No. 97-
476, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), H.R. 5106 deleted the reciprocity requirement incor-
porated in S. 816. Three factors prompted rejection of any type of a reciprocity
requirement:
(1) determining whether reciprocal rights exist would be difficult and costly;
(2) a stringent reciprocity test might reduce the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws; and
(3) a reciprocity requirement might adversely affect U.S. foreign relations.
Id. at 2. H.R. 5106 was never enacted into law during the 97th Congress. For a brief
review of previously proposed reciprocity bills, see infra note 33.
5. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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the Clayton Act is to "be an ever-present threat to deter anyone con-
templating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.' 6
Later, however, the Court recognized the additional goal of section
four. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,7 the Court
stated that "Section 4... is in essence a remedial provision ....
Of course, treble damages.. . play an important role in penalizing
wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing. . . . It nevertheless.. . is
designed primarily as a remedy." 8
To effectuate the goals of compensation and deterrence, Con-
gress established a three-pronged system for United States antitrust
enforcement:9 (1) suits initiated by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion;10 (2) suits initiated by the Department of Justice;" and (3) suits
initiated by private parties. 12 The first two classes of suits are exclu-
sively governmental remedies; they include suits for injunctions,
divestment of corporations, and criminal prosecutions.1 3 The third
class includes the private treble damage remedy provided by section
four of the Clayton Act.
This Note deals exclusively with the third prong of the antitrust
enforcement structure, private suits. Because of the limited re-
sources available to governmental agencies, the private remedy has
become a vital supplement to public antitrust enforcement. The
Supreme Court perceives private actions based upon section four as
"a bulwark of antitrust enforcement."'14 This Note analyzes the con-
troversy regarding whether foreign governments should be extended
this right of a private treble damage remedy in antitrust actions.
B. STANDING OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO
SUE IN UNITED STATES COURTS
Although several well-defined exceptions exist,' 5 foreign nations
6. Id. at 139.
7. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
8. Id. at 485-86.
9. E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTrRUST PRIMER 19 (1974).
10. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976); Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
11. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 9
(1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
12. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
13. Additionally, a Clayton Act amendment granted the United States Government
standing to sue for actual damages. Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
14. Perma Life Mufflers, supra note 5, at 139.
15. Some recognized restrictions limit a foreign nation's right to bring suit in United
States courts. First, only suits of a strictly civil nature may be brought. See The Saphire,
78 U.S. (11 Wall) 164 (1871); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Second,
nations at war with the United States are denied standing in United States courts. See
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 7b (1976). Third, nations that are not
recognized by the United States executive branch are denied standing in United States
1982]
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generally have standing to sue in American courts by virtue of the
principle of comity.' 6 The Supreme Court has recognized that
"'[c]omity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion,. . nor of mere courtesy and good will."'1 7 Rather, the princi-
ple of comity has been defined as the practice of each nation's courts
doing "justice that justice may be done in return."' 8 Thus, the idea
of reciprocity underlies the comity principle.
Considerations of comity necessarily influenced the Supreme
Court in deciding Pfizer v. India.'9 In Pfizer, the governments of
India, Iran and the Philippines20 filed civil suits on behalf of their
citizens against several American pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The plaintiff governments alleged that the defendants had "con-
spired to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign trade in the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics,"'2'
thus violating the Sherman Anti-trust Act.22 In deciding whether the
courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Rep. of Vietnam v.
Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977) (suit dismissed because Republic of Vietnam no
longer recognized by the United States Government).
Only nations that are not recognized by the United States are denied standing. The
Supreme Court has rejected the mere severance of diplomatic relations, the existence of
"unfriendly" relations, or failure to grant reciprocity of treatment for United States
nations suing in courts of foreign nations as grounds for denying a foreign country stand-
ing in United States courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
16. Annot., 54 L.Ed. 2d 854, 857 (1978).
17. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
18. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139
N.E. 259, 260 (1923). Comity can be practiced by a country's legislative and executive
branches as well as by its judiciary. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164. The Supreme Court
explained the principle of comity in the following way:
Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency.
It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the
opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of deci-
sion, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question. But its obliga-
tion is not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one court might become
a precedent, increasing in weight with each successive adjudication, until the
whole country was tied down to an unsound principle. Comity persuades; but it
does not command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how it may
with propriety be decided. It recognizes the fact that the primary duty of every
court is to dispose of cases according to the law and the facts; in a word, to
decide them right.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900).
19. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
20. Spain, South Korea, West Germany, Columbia, Kuwait, and the Republic of
Vietnam brought similar actions. Id. at 309, n.l.
21. Id. at 309-10.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). These suits were based on a claim that a number of
pharmaceutical manufacturers had overcharged the plaintiffs in the sale of antibiotics.
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 396 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976). Pfizer evolved
out of the antibiotic antitrust litigation which included approximately 150 civil actions
filed under § 4 of the Clayton Act. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 314 F.
Supp. 710, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afid, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (1971). Over sixty of these suits were settled for a combined total of over 80 million
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plaintiffs had properly brought suit in the case, the Supreme Court
held that foreign governments are "persons" within the meaning of
section one of the Clayton Act.2 3 Thus, it necessarily follows that
foreign governments have standing as "persons" to sue for treble
damages under section four of the Clayton Act.
2 4
In determining that the section four remedy of private antitrust
suits should be extended to foreign governments, the Supreme Court
relied primarily on two previous decisions. In United States v.
Cooper,25 the Court held that the U.S. government is not a "person"
within the meaning of section four of the Clayton Act.26 In Georgia
v. Evans,27 however, the Court held that a state is a "person' within
the meaning of section four, and, therefore, capable of instituting a
private treble damage antitrust suit.2 8 After examining these two
cases, the Pfizer Court reasoned that a foreign government, like a
private person or a domestic state, can become a victim of anticom-
petitive practices when purchasing United States goods and serv-
ices.29 Further, the Court found that the availability of private
remedies is essential to foreign governments that, unlike the United
States, are provided with no alternative remedies under United
States antitrust laws.30 The Court concluded:
We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a
[foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped in [international] com-
merce, of the civil remedy of treble damages which is available to other pur-
dollars. 440 F.2d at 1082-84. The majority of these suits, however, involved domestic
plaintiffs, not foreign governments.
23. Section 1 of the Clayton Act provides:
The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State,
or the laws of any foreign country.
Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
24. Two different bases for a foreign government's standing to sue exist: parens
patriae and representative claims. Aparenspatriae action is one in which "the State, as
parens patriae, can bring suit only to protect the common welfare of its people as a
whole." Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Anti-
trust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 193, 209 (1970) (emphasis deleted). Iran and India had
filed suit in aparenspatriae capacity, but this claim was dismissed in a separate appeal.
Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
In a representative claim, the sovereign sues not for injuries to its own interests as a
sovereign, but for injuries to its individual citizens. See Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign
Nations, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1975).
25. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
26. Congress, however, later amended the Clayton Act to allow the federal govern-
ment to sue for actual damages. See supra note 13.
27. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
28. Shortly after Evans, the Court held that a State may not be sued for antitrust
offenses. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
29. 434 U.S. at 318.
30. Id. The United States has a variety of other remedies available, including crimi-
nal prosecutions and injunctions. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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chasers who suffer through violation of the Act.... Nothing in the Act, its
history, or its policy, could justify so restrictive a construction of the word
"person" ..... Such a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign
nation], when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law merely because it is
a [foreign nation].
3 1
Demonstrating apparent dissatisfaction with the broad standing
fights afforded foreign sovereigns, 32 several members of the Ninety-
fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses proposed a number of bills that
would have partially or fully abrogated the Pfizer decision.33 These
bills, however, failed to reach their respective floors. Another more
recent attempt has been made to limit the Pfizer Court's ruling. A
bill was introduced in the Ninety-seventh Congress that would have
31. 434 U.S. at 318 citing 316 U.S. 159, 162-63. The Court took this language from
Evans, substituting "foreign nations" for "states." See supra note 20.
32. Some courts restrict the Pfizer decision to its facts. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (1979), aft'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). "[T]his court
must refrain from extending the Pfizer ruling beyond the strict confines of that case." Id.
at 572 (Foreign sovereigns were antitrust defendants). A strict reading of Pfizer would
require a finding of "compelling circumstances" before standing would be granted. This
contention is based on a Pfizer footnote, recognizing that the plaintiff foreign nations
were "faced with monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed for the health
and safety of its people." 434 U.S. at 318 n.18. The opinion, however, taken as a whole,
refutes this narrow reading of the decision.
33. Following the Pfizer decision, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees
reported on separate versions of proposed legislation that would have overturned Pfizer.
H.R. 11942 would have denied standing to all foreign governments. It stated that § 4
"should not authorize suits by a foreign sovereign government." H.R. 11942, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 3 (1978). This bill as well as S. 1874 failed to reach the floor before adjourn-
ment. [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 882, at A-21; [1978] ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 884, at A-11-12. S. 2486 conditioned foreign
government standing on satisfying a general reciprocity requirement, allowing no foreign
government to bring an action in any United States Court unless:
(1) the U.S. is entitled to sue in its own name and in its own behalf on a civil
claim in the courts of that foreign sovereign; and
(2) such foreign sovereign prohibits restrictive trade practices by its own laws.
S. 2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1978). See infra notes 201-206 and accompanying
text. This reciprocal antitrust bill was reintroduced in the 96th Congress. S. 317, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Another proposed bill would have required a finding of "strict
reciprocity." S. 2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See infra notes 197-200 & 206 and
accompanying text. The standard in this bill, according to Senator DeConcini, would
have made the right to sue "dependent on the existence of foreign laws formulated pre-
cisely like our own." 125 CONG. RPc. 1704 (Feb. 1, 1979) (remarks of Mr. DeConcini,
defending S. 317 and opposing previous attempts to impose a strict reciprocity require-
ment). Section 3 of the Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979 (Illinois Brick Bill) provided
another reciprocity standard:
[S]uits under... [Section 4 of the Clayton Act] brought by foreign sovereign
governments, departments, or agencies thereof, shall be limited to actual dam-
ages; and ... no foreign sovereign may maintain an action in any Court of the
United States under the authority of this section unless its laws would have for-
bidden the type or category of conduct on which the action is based if that con-
duct had occurred within its territory at the time it occurred in the United States,
and unless its laws allow the government of the United States to recover dam-
ages caused by such conduct through the judicial or administrative processes of
the foreign sovereign.
S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979). Congress failed to act on any of the above bills.
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imposed a reciprocity requirement on the right of a foreign govern-
ment to institute a private antitrust suit under section four of the
Clayton Act. Although subsequent amendments to this bill eliminat-
ing the reciprocity requirement were approved, the Ninety-seventh
Congress failed to enact the bill as amended.34
II
POLICIES
In determining whether foreign governments should enjoy
standing to sue in federal courts for treble antitrust damages, Con-
gress must consider a number of different and sometimes conflicting
policies.35 The policies most frequently advanced to support a broad
grant of standing rights36 are: (1) protecting consumers; (2) provid-
ing compensation; (3) deterring further antitrust violations;
(4) encouraging free trade; and (5) maintaining good relations with
other nations. The arguments most frequently posited to support the
imposition of a reciprocity requirement, 37 thereby limiting the anti-
trust standing rights of foreign governments, include: (1) resolving
conflicts in an equitable manner; and (2) encouraging other nations
to adopt antitrust laws. The following analysis indicates that a reci-
procity requirement must not be imposed if the policies supporting
standing are to be forwarded. The analysis further demonstrates
that a reciprocity requirement is, at best, a neutral factor in advanc-
ing the policies traditionally cited in support of imposing such a
requirement. Achieving these desired policy goals requires neither
the imposition nor absence of a reciprocity requirement.
34. See supra note 4.
35. Chief Justice Burger, attacking the Pflzer majority's "undisguised exercise of leg-
islative power," stated that "[t]he resolution of the delicate and important policy issue of
giving more than 150 foreign countries the benefits and remedies enacted to protect
American consumers should be left to the Congress and the Executive." Pfizer, supra
note 19, at 320-21 (1978) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
36. For a general discussion of policies supporting standing, see Velvel, supra note
24, at 4-10, 18-19; Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private Federal
Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNELL INr'L L. J. 137, 145-46, 150-53 (1975); Note, Foreign Nation
Suitsfor Treble Damages Under the Clayton Act After Pflzer v. Government of India, 13 U.
MIcH. J. L. REF. 405, 412-20 (1980); Note, Pfizer, Inc. v. Government oflndix" The Abiliy
of Foreign Governments to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. CoM. 299, 312-13, 315-16 (1977-78); 20 B.C.L. REv. 411, 421-424 (1979); 24 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 771, 784-86, 788-89 (1979); 17 DUQ. L. REv. 545, 550-53 (1978-79); 27
EMORY L. J. 815, 835-39 (1978); 19 HARV. INV'L L. J. 701, 706 (1978); 12 J. MAR. J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 187, 194-97, 202-06 (1978); 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 333, 341-42
(1978).
37. For a definition of reciprocity, see supra note 4. As used here, reciprocity does
not refer to any specific formulation of standing requirements. For a general discussion
of policies supporting reciprocity, see Velvel, supra note 24, at 11-16, 21-23; Note, supra
note 36, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. at 413-14; 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 771, 788; 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 333, 341-42.
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A. POLICIES SUPPORTING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT'S
RIGHT TO STANDING
L Consumer Protection
The antitrust laws are primarily designed to protect consumers
from anticompetitive business practices.38 Thus, other policy goals
should be consistent with this central purpose.39 Only sound reasons
will justify the sacrifice of consumer protection to the furtherance of
a less important policy goal. The controversy resulting from the Pfi-
zer decision specifically deals with the degree of consumer protec-
tion Congress wishes to sacrifice in order to forward another policy
goal. Congress can let the fzer decision stand, thereby empowering
the largest possible number of private plaintiffs with the right to sue
for treble damages. This would provide for enforcement of United
States antitrust laws to the fullest extent possible. Or, Congress may
choose to qualify the Pfizer decision, limiting both the extent to
which the antitrust laws are enforced and the degree of protection
afforded to consumers.40
2. Compensation
The Supreme Court recognizes compensation as the primary
objective of section four of the Clayton Act.41 Although section
seven of the Sherman Act, the predecessor of section four, "was con-
ceived of primarily as a remedy for '[t]he people of the United States
as individuals,' especially consumers,"' 42 the Clayton Act
"'extend[ed] the remedy under Section seven of the Sherman Act' to
persons injured by virtue of any antitrust violation. ' 43 This broader
characterization of section four more effectively advances desired
policy goals. The right of an injured party to collect damages from a
wrongdoer in a private civil suit has traditionally been accepted as
38. "In light of the clear legislative history, it is not surprising that Federal judicial
decisions, including those of the Supreme Court, have long recognized the central pur-
pose of antitrust laws in protecting consumers." S. REP. No. 239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1979) (report on Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979).
39. Such policy goals may be broad or specific. For example, compare the broad
goal of maintaining good relations with other countries to the specific goal of encourag-
ing other nations to adopt antitrust laws.
40. Enforcement of antitrust laws, however, is not limited to private suits by consum-
ers. For a discussion of the three prongs of antitrust enforcement, see supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
41. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
See also supra note 8 and accompanying text. The broad purpose of section 4 is to
compensate the victims of antitrust violations, and by so compensating, to deter future
violations. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314.
42. Brunswiclc Corp., supra note 41, 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (quoting from 21 CONG.
REc. 1767-68, 1890 (remarks of Senator George)).
43. Id. (quoting from H. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 1914).
PECIPROCITY
an integral aspect of the justice system in the United States. Nothing
seems to preclude applying this fundamental tenet solely because the
injured party is a foreign sovereign.44 A foreign government can suf-
fer injuries resulting from violations of the antitrust laws as surely as
American consumers can.45 Further, while treble damage antitrust
actions were adopted primarily to benefit American consumers,46 the
protection afforded by United States antitrust laws has never been
limited to United States nationals. The Sherman and Clayton Acts
expressly provide that "person" includes "corporations and associa-
tions existing under or authorized by the laws of. . .any foreign
country." 47 Granting foreign governments standing to sue is consis-
tent with both the United States conception of the civil action and
the remedial purpose underlying section four of the Clayton Act.
Thus, the policy goal of compensation would best be effectuated by
granting standing rights to foreign governments.
3. Deterrence of Future Antitrust Violations
Compensating a foreign government for damages resulting from
antitrust violations has the concomitant effect of deterring future
behavior inconsistent with the antitrust laws of the United States. 48
A grant of standing to foreign governments may therefore protect
both foreign and domestic consumers from future illegal acts. An
analysis of the deterrent effect resulting from antitrust suits, when
examined in the light of other policy considerations, justifies the
extension of standing rights to foreign governments.
The deterrent effect of antitrust damage awards can be viewed,
for analytical purposes, as affecting two distinct geographic areas:
the territorial United States, and all areas outside of its boundaries.
49
44. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313-18. The Court construed § 4 of the Clayton Act such
that the fact a party is either foreign or a sovereign would not preclude that party's right
to standing in a private treble damage suit.
45. The Court recognized that both consumers in the United States and foreign gov-
ernments were injured by activities of Pfizer, Inc., as well as other drug companies. See
Id. at 310 & nn. 2, 3.
46. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976). See supra note 23. The Sherman Act uses similar lan-
guage. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
48. The Pfizer majority's description of the purposes of § 4 highlights the integral
relationship between the goals of compensation and deterrence: the antitrust laws are
intended "to deter violators and deprive them of" 'the fruits of their illegality,'" and 'to
compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries."' Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314.
Requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff treble money damages deprives the wrong-
doer of illegal "fruits," compensates the victim, and diminishes the likelihood of future
violations. Thus, although they are theoretically separate policy objectives, compensa-
tion and deterrence are, from the practical perspective of § 4, inseparable.
49. The discussion in this section assumes that United States antitrust law applies in
both of these geographic areas. Thus, the acts violating the antitrust laws simultaneously
have the requisite effects on both commerce among the states and commerce with foreign
1982]
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The goal of deterring violations having effects within United States
boundaries ("domestic deterrence") underlies United States antitrust
law.5 0 When an antitrust violation produces effects both at home
and abroad, however, it is unclear whether deterrence of these for-
eign effects ("foreign deterrence") 5' should be considered an equally
important goal of United States antitrust law. Congress did not
delineate the intended scope of the antitrust laws.52 Commerce with
foreign nations, however, is subject to the prohibitions of the anti-
trust laws.53 In addition, Congress granted standing under section
four to "corporations and associations existing under or authorized
by the laws of. . .any foreign country. ' 54 These statutory provi-
sions, along with the generally broad standing rights found under
section four, demonstrate congressional awareness of the fact that
foreign deterrence might be possible.55 Further, Congress failed to
require a preliminary showing that domestic deterrence would be
advanced before allowing a foreign entity to bring an antitrust suit
for injuries suffered abroad.56 Finally, Congress created a limited
exception to the application of both the Sherman and the Clayton
Acts to foreign commerce in the Webb-Pomerene Act.57 Where that
Act does not apply, however, the courts, the FTC, and the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice have usually
decided on both the scope and degree of importance attributed to
foreign deterrence. For example, the courts determine the extent of
nations. See supra note 2 and Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976). The discussion
also assumes that United State courts have personal jurisdiction over the violators.
50. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
51. The term "foreign violation" refers to any violation of United States antitrust
laws which has effects outside United States boundaries.
52. [W]hether a foreign nation is entitled to sue for treble damages depends upon
whether it is a 'person' as that word is used in § 4 [of the Clayton Act]. There is
no statutory provision or legislative history that provides a clear answer, it seems
apparent that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman and
Clayton Act were enacted.
Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312.
53. See Clayton Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976); see also supra note 49.
54. See id; see also supra note 23.
55. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
56. See generally Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
57. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
The Webb-Pomerene Act was intended to help American firms compete in for-
eign markets, especially against foreign cartels. The Act provides that an associ-
ation entered into for the 'sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually
engaged solely in such export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the
course of export trade by such association' is not illegal, provided it is not in
restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor of such an export associ-
ation. The Act also contains a provision prohibiting unfair methods of competi-
tion in export trade against competitors engaged in export trade.
KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws,58 while
the Antitrust Division59 and the FTC60 decide which foreign viola-
tions of the antitrust laws will be prosecuted.
Although Congress has not directly addressed the question of
foreign deterrence, an examination of the interests of the United
States in deterring such violations indicates that Congress should not
impose a reciprocity requirement on the right of a foreign govern-
ment to bring a private antitrust suit. The threat of a treble damage
action by foreign governments can deter not only foreign, but also
domestic violations of the antitrust laws.61 American consumers
would benefit directly from this increased domestic deterrence; they
would benefit, at least indirectly, from foreign deterrence.
62
Allowing foreign governments standing under section four
would substantially contribute to foreign deterrence. The number of
potential plaintiffs capable of bringing antitrust suits would be
expanded to include over 150 foreign nations.63 In addition, these
governments, having access to greater financial resources than pri-
vate parties, would be better able to sustain themselves through pro-
tracted antitrust litigation. Thus, these nations would be more likely
to bring such suits. Finally, the antitrust law of the United States
can only deter anticompetitive business practices by affording these
governments standing rights in private antitrust actions.64
At present, no satisfactory method exists for deterring violations
of United States antitrust laws that have foreign effects; a grant of
standing to all foreign nations would serve this purpose.65 Without
58. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
59. See KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 19.
60. Id. at 52.
61. The acts of a business firm may result in both domestic and foreign violations. In
such cases, the threat of a treble damages action by parties injured only by the foreign
violations will certainly deter the foreign violations. Moreover, this threat similarly may
deter domestic violations. If a firm can select the locations in which the effects of its
violations will be felt, it may target its activities so that both domestic and foreign effects
are produced. When a firm has such control, the threat of suit by parties injured only by
the foreign violations would probably deter only those violations. The firm's likely
response would be to discontinue its foreign violations and continue its domestic ones.
Where a firm has no such control over the scope of its violations and its acts produce
both domestic and foreign violations, the threat of suit would deter both types of viola-
tive acts.
62. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
63. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 330 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. The right to sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act is a personal one.
65. While the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized the importance of deterrence,
it was willing to sacrifice an element of deterrence in order to advance "fairness":
In construing the reciprocity provisions of this section, courts should be mindful
that it seeks to strike a balance between two broad objectives: the principles of
equity which require some reciprocity, and the deterrent purposes of the antitrust
laws. Overly strict interpretation of the reciprocity provisions may operate to
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the right to bring antitrust suits, foreign governments, in an attempt
to protect themselves, might institute more severe measures, includ-
ing boycotts and tariffs. Such measures, however, carry with them
the ironic possibilities of both reducing competition and restricting
trade.66 Further, many nations, particularly the developing coun-
tries, cannot resort to such measures. 67 Finally, when a foreign
country is in great need of the violator's goods or services, these
measures are of no help. The country has no choice; it must buy on
the seller's terms and hope to sue later for damages. 68
4. Free Trade
In deciding whether or not to impose a reciprocity requirement,
Congress must consider the commitment of the United States to free
trade as an important policy goal of the United States antitrust
laws.69 Any increase in competition in world trade resulting from
prohibit most or all foreign governments from invoking American antitrust laws.
Such interpretation will frustrate the deterrent purposes of such laws, effectively
encouraging American companies to engage in anticompetitive practices in their
dealings with foreign governments. Our antitrust laws seek to discourage such
conduct by American companies regardless of the identity of its victims. On the
other hand, these provisions reflect the proposition that it is unfair to permit
foreign-governments to reap the benefits of American law when the laws of such
governments permit the very type of conduct for which such governments are
seeking compensation here. Overly liberal interpretation of the reciprocity pro-
visions will permit such inequity. Thus, in interpreting the reciprocity provi-
sions, courts should seek to strike the balance which they reflect: allowing foreign
governments to assist in enforcing our antitrust laws when such governments
evidence a parallel opposition to the type or category of conduct challenged here.
S. RaP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 46.
66. In his fzer dissent, Chief Justice Burger cited these types of measures as substi-
tutes for a foreign government's antitrust remedy under § 4 of the Clayton Act. He did
not, however, address the possible anticompetitive effects of these measures. See Pfizer,
434 U.S. at 326-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In addition, the use of such measures can-
not enhance domestic deterrence; actions for treble damages have this concomitant bene-
ficial effect. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Similarly, the developing nations may not have either adequate antitrust laws or
the expertise required to enable them to prosecute or even detect antitrust violations by
United States corporations. Thus, these countries need the assistance of United States
courts, the American bar, and the federal discovery rules in order to achieve relief from
United States antitrust violations. Further, access to the United States legal system
would allow these countries more bargaining leverage in their negotiations with multina-
tional corporations.
Some commentators have observed that some countries, because of this lack of experi-
ence and knowledge, have difficulty even drafting antitrust laws that suit their particular
economies and economic needs. Conversation with Professor J.B. Barcelo, Cornell Law
School (March 15, 1981); see also Oesterle, United Nations Conference on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.. 1, 12 & nn.62-65 (1981).
68. See fizer, 434 U.S. at 318 n.18.
69. See, e.g., the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, which states in part:
[I]t is declared to be the policy of the United States to seek to bring about further
agreement and cooperation among nations and international bodies, as soon as
possible, on ways and means which will best reduce obstacles to and restrictions
upon international trade, eliminate unfair trade practices, promote mutually
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the deterrent effects of United States antitrust laws benefits the world
economy in much the same way as the United States economy bene-
fits from domestic deterrence. For example, when domestic competi-
tion increases, prices decline and inflation abates.70 The world
economy dramatically affects the domestic economy, especially
because worldwide inflation contributes to domestic inflation. Thus,
American consumers would benefit from the increased competition
resulting from more effective foreign deterrence.
71
Conversely, as recognized by the Senate Judiciary Committee, it
is hoped that the imposition of a reciprocity requirement would
encourage other nations to adopt their own antitrust laws.72 Assum-
ing that other countries did adopt such laws and were able to enforce
them effectively, international free trade would be enhanced.
Extending standing rights to foreign governments under section four
would not provide them with this same incentive to adopt their own
antitrust laws.
It remains unclear, however, whether the imposition of a reci-
procity requirement actually would result in the adoption and
enforcement of antitrust laws by other countries. The Senate Judici-
ary Committee failed to advance any empirical evidence to support
this proposition. 73 Further, many countries, including most nations
that currently have no antitrust laws, are hostile toward the eco-
nomic and political influence exerted on them by the developed
countries.74 This suggests that the adoption of a reciprocity require-
ment by the United States with the stated goal of encouraging the
adoption of antitrust laws abroad would not be warmly received.
Incentives that are adequate to encourage foreign nations to
adopt antitrust laws may exist independently of the uncertain
encouragement attributed to the adoption of a reciprocity require-
ment. Countries with no antitrust laws recently received positive,
consensual encouragement to adopt such laws to govern their own
domestic business practices when the United Nations adopted the
"Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices. ' 75 The negotiations result-
advantageous commercial relations, and otherwise facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade and promote the stability of international
economic relations.
22 U.S.C. § 286k (1976). This discussion assumes that United States courts have per-
sonal jurisdiction over violators of domestic antitrust law.
70. See, e.g., Velvel, supra note 24, at 7-8.
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
73. See S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 45-50.
74. See Oesterle, supra note 67, at 16-17 & nn.50-56.
75. See generally id.
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ing in the drafting of the "Principles and Rules" vividly illustrate the
drastic differences between the less developed countries' conception
of an ideal antitrust code and the current statutory scheme of the
United States. In addition, the interests less developed countries
have in adopting antitrust laws sharply diverge from United States
concerns.76 Thus, whether the United States, by adopting a reciproc-
ity requirement, would be implicitly encouraging the adoption of
antitrust laws designed to meet the specific needs of each country
remains questionable.
To assume that a reciprocity requirement would exert sufficient
influence and incentive to cause nations to adopt antitrust laws is
very tenuous. A grant of standing rights, however, would maximize
deterrence, thereby increasing worldwide competition. Thus, the
goal of encouraging free trade through increased competition
requires that no reciprocity requirement be imposed.
77
5. Comity
Before imposing a reciprocity requirement, Congress must con-
sider an additional policy: the principle of comity.78 If the United
States Government expects to use foreign legal systems, it must give
foreign governments access to its own courts. The State Department
has recognized that the Government needs such access:
The United States Government frequently sues abroad. The Depart-
ment of Justice has a special office (the Office of Foreign Litigation) just for
this purpose. The United States generally enjoys the same access to foreign
courts and the same remedies as private litigants. If foreign governments
replicated the Pfizer [reciprocity amendment] approach, it would presumably
be more difficult for the United States to recover on claims abroad.
7 9
Justice Douglas stated the problem clearly: "[I]t would offend the
sensibilities of nations if [a] country, not at war with us, had our
courthouse doors closed to it."80
Allowing foreign governments to sue under section four should
not evoke a dramatic response from other nations. Rather, a grant
of standing rights would be consistent with the long-recognized gen-
eral rule that foreign nations can bring civil actions in the courts of
76. Cf id.
77. For further discussion of the goal of encouraging the adoption of antitrust laws
abroad, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of the principle of comity, see supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
79. S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 69-70 (letter from D.J. Bennett, Jr., Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, to Senator Charles Mathias,
Jr. May 8, 1979).
80. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1972) (con-
curring opinion).
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the United States.81 The imposition of a reciprocity requirement,
however, may result in extreme responses from foreign governments.
Nations may either change their laws to conform to the reciprocity
requirements, thereby availing themselves of section four standing,
or, instead, they may "reciprocate" by denying the United States
Government standing to sue for antitrust damages in their own
courts. These nations may take a further step and deny the United
States Government standing in other areas in which it has previously
been granted. Indeed, even countries whose laws meet the require-
ments of the United States reciprocity standard may, on principle,
deny the United States standing in their courts.
82
Some nations have already demonstrated disapproval of any
reciprocity requirement. In Pfizer, the -Federal Republic of
Germany filed an amicus curiae brief supporting an extension of sec-
tion four standing rights to foreign governments. 83 Germany, whose
antitrust law development and enforcement is second only to that of
the United States, currently allows the United States to bring private
antitrust actions in its courts.84 Germany also urged the United
States Department of State to open discussion on the Pfizer issue to
other departments of the executive branch, as well as the interna-
tional community.85 The German position is that "[t]he concept of
granting Governments and nationals of other countries the guaran-
tees of the national legal system will quickly deteriorate if it is made
contingent on the comparability of statutes and provisions.
'86 Simi-
larly, Great Britain is likely to disapprove of a reciprocity require-
ment. The United Kingdom already resents the attitude that the
United States has previously demonstrated through the broad extra-
territorial application of United States antitrust laws.
[Tihe practices to which successive United Kingdom Governments have
taken exception have arisen in the case of the United States of America....
I have to say that the United States has shown a tendency in certain
respects over the last three decades increasingly to try to mould the interna-
81. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
82. Some foreign governments view the extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust laws with hostility. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 1040-46 (2d ed. 1976). Often, this negative attitude extends even further and
includes multinational business enterprises generally. See Oesterle, supra note 67, at 16-
17. The imposition of a reciprocity requirement may be viewed with this same degree of
hostility, even if it causes no actual economic harm.
83. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 309.
84. S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 72 (letter from D.J. Bennett, Jr., Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, to Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, quoting a letter from the Federal Republic
of Germany to the Department of State).
85. Id. at 71 (letter from Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State).
86. Id. at 72.
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tional economic and trading world in its own image.
87
Thus, while imposing a reciprocity requirement is probably not a
violation of international law,88 such a requirement may damage
United States relations with other countries and adversely affect the
integrity of the principle of comity.89
B. POLICIES ADVANCED IN SUPPORT OF
A RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT
1. Resolving Conflicts Equitably
In deciding whether to grant foreign governments standing in
antitrust suits, Congress should consider principles of fairness.90 The
Pfizer issue involves three parties, each directly interested in an equi-
table resolution of the conflict among them: the American con-
sumer, foreign governments, and the antitrust violator. An
examination of the concerns of each party demonstrates that each
cannot be treated with maximum equity; fairness to some party must
be sacrificed in order to adequately resolve the conflict.
To make a fairness evaluation, one must begin with the premise
that requiring the violators of United States antitrust laws to com-
pensate their victims is fair to the violator, the victim, and to the
American people, who have a direct interest in seeing the antitrust
laws enforced. Considerations of equity change, however, when the
87. Comments of Mr. Nott when introducing the Protection of Trading Interests Act
in Parliament. This Act is specially designed to undermine the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States antitrust law. PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th Ser.) 1533-34 (1979); see gener-
ally PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th Ser.) 1533-39 (1979). One commentator views the Act as an
invitation to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution to the extraterritorial application
problem. See Note, Section 6 of Great Britain's Protection of Trading Interests Act: The
Lever and the Claw, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 457 (1981).
88. One commentator believes that a denial of standing to foreign governments in
the Pfizer context "would seemingly [violate] international law, for as the Court [has]
previously held... , 'reciprocity of treatment is an essential ingredient of comity gener-
ally and therefore, of the privilege of foreign states to bring suit here."' 19 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 701, 706 (1978) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408,
411. Reciprocal treatment may be an essential part of comity, but comity itself is
"neither a matter of absolute obligation ... nor of mere courtesy and good will." Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 409 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 17, 163-64).
Thus, it is difficult to understand how such a denial would be a violation of international
law. Conversation with Professor J.B. Barcelo, Cornell Law School (March 15, 1981).
89. For a discussion of comity in relation to the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust laws, see KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 263.
90. The Senate cited equitable considerations as its major justification for imposing a
reciprocity requirement after Pfizer:
[Pfizer] arguably created two inequities. First, it permitted foreign governments
to seek redress of business conduct not disapproved in their own countries. Sec-
ond, it granted a right of action to foreign governments which deny the United
States Government access to their own courts. In the view of the committee,
both considerations must be balanced against the importance of enforcing our
antitrust laws.
S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 45.
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plaintiff in an antitrust action has engaged in the type of conduct
that constitutes the basis of his complaint: anticompetitive business
practices. In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court has granted
standing to such plaintiffs. 91 'The plaintiff who reaps the reward of
treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the
defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding
public policy in favor of competition." 92 The Court made this state-
ment with reference to a private plaintiff who could also be sued for
his own anticompetitive practices. In contrast, foreign governments
are immune from certain antitrust suits.
93
This problem must be considered in the context of a foreign
government. It seems inherently unfair to allow a foreign govern-
ment that permits or even participates in anticompetitive practices in
one area of commerce9 4 to sue in a United States court for injuries
resulting from anticompetitive conduct involving a different com-
modity.95 This appears particularly unjust in light of the fact that a
foreign government is often immune to such suits. Yet, it seems
equally unfair to deny compensation to the foreign government, a
victim that has been forced to pay higher prices, while the guilty
party flouts the antitrust laws.96 The violator becomes the big win-
ner; he retains all ill-gotten gains, avoids paying penalties, and main-
tains the freedom to engage in any restrictive business practices that
involve foreign governments as consumers.
97
In either situation, fair treatment of one party will likely result
in inequitable effects on the others. While it may be fair to deny a
foreign government standing because of unclean hands, in such situ-
91. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., supra note 5. The Court was faced with a private party
wishing to sue. The question of whether a foreign government also would be able to
bring suit was not before the Court.
92. Perma Life Mufers, Inc., supra note 5, at 139; see S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38,
at 11.
93. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602(a) (1976); see
also, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553
(C.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). For a general discussion of the
defenses of a foreign state to antitrust actions in the United States, see Comment,
Defenses to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 20
HARv. INT'L L.J. 583 (1979).
94. For example, price fixing in the oil industry.
95. For example, monopolistic practices by a grain company.
96. Contrast the case in which the foreign government conspires in the conduct of
which it complains. In such a circumstance, a strong case to deny standing would exist.
If, for example, a defendant domestic oil company showed that the foreign government
plaintiff helped the company fix oil prices, the plaintiff should be estopped from filing an
antitrust claim.
97. One commentator argues that such profits may be used as a "war chest" to sup-
port anticompetitive business practices within the boundaries of the United States. See
Velvel, supra note 24, at 3, 8. Granting foreign governments standing under United
States antitrust laws eliminates this problem.
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ations both the victim of the violation and consumers in the Untied
States are treated unjustly. They are all denied the full protection of
the antitrust laws. To grant a foreign government standing, how-
ever, allows it to recover damages for anticompetitive business prac-
tices which it uses or allows to be used to victimize others.
The policy of treating all concerned parties fairly must be
deemed a neutral factor in evaluating the desirability of a reciprocity
requirement. A grant of standing to foreign governments in private
antitrust suits may, in some instances, allow the government to bene-
fit from violations in which it participated or impliedly approved. A
denial of standing allows a violator to be unjustly enriched as a
result of its illegal acts. The imposition of a reciprocity requirement
would not solve this dilemma. Standing would be allowed in some
cases and denied in others, resulting in the random treatment of vio-
lators. Principles of equitable treatment would not be advanced by
such an outcome.
2. Encouraging the Adoption of Antitrust Laws Abroad
A final policy must be considered when assessing the desirabil-
ity of adopting a reciprocity requirement: the role such a require-
ment would play in encouraging other nations to adopt antitrust
laws. Such laws are designed to promote free trade.98 Thus, it is in
the interest of the United States for other countries to enact antitrust
laws. The Senate Judiciary Committee favors the adoption of anti-
trust laws with provisions that are similar to those found in the anti-
trust laws of the United States.99 The Committee believes that
imposing a reciprocity requirement would motivate other nations to
adopt their own antitrust laws. If such laws are effectively enforced,
98. The Senate Judiciary expressed its concern with respect to this goal:
It is... the committee's intention to encourage foreign governments, as a condi-
tion of their invocation of American antitrust laws, to maintain judicial or
administrative processes which both limit restrictive business practices and are
open to the United States.
S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 45.
Mhe Pfizer decision without more would grant a right of access regardless of the
nature of the laws of the foreign sovereign, providing the benefits of American
law-and the potential retention of the fruits of restrictive trade practice-with
no incentive to adopt laws proscribing the very activities complained of in this
country.
Id. at 47.
99. The Committee recommended that a foreign sovereign be denied standing to sue
"unless its laws would have forbidden the type or category of conduct on which the
action is based if that conduct had occurred within its territory at the time it occurred in
the United States," and unless the United States government has equivalent standing
rights in the foreign country. S. REP. No. 239, supra note 38, at 74. The Committee
failed to consider the differing nature of foreign cultures and economies. These factors
could require a competition law vastly different from that of the United States.
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free trade will be enhanced. 00 Such a requirement, however, might
also cause a foreign nation to use extreme restrictive measures which
directly inhibit trade. 10' Further, developing countries may not have
either option available. The current absence of antitrust laws, com-
bined with the inexperience of these nations in dealing with sophisti-
cated illegal business practices, may make it impossible for them to
detect, and therefore to stop, anticompetitive practices. Because the
developing countries comprise the majority of those nations that
have no antitrust laws, the recommendation of the Senate Judiciary
Committee advocating a reciprocity requirement appears extremely
paternalistic. Finally, attempting to encourage the adoption of anti-
trust laws by imposing a reciprocity requirement may prove detri-
mental to free trade. 0 2
In summary, the policies of consumer protection, free trade,
compensation, deterrence, and comity require that the right of a for-
eign government to standing under section four of the Clayton Act
not be limited by a reciprocity requirement. The goals of encourag-
ing adoption of antitrust laws abroad and treating all concerned par-
ties fairly do not require a reciprocity standard. The assumption that
a reciprocity requirement will encourage other countries to adopt
antitrust laws is not well-founded. Finally, although denying stand-
ing to foreign governments may result in equitable treatment to
some parties, corresponding inequities to others would be inevitable.
An evaluation of the policies advanced by allowing a foreign
government standing and the goals traditionally attributed to reci-
procity strongly suggest that a reciprocity requirement is unneces-
sary. A complete evaluation of a reciprocity standard, however,
requires an assessment of the practical effects of such a requirement.
Examining the foreign countries that would be excluded from the
courts of the United States under the present state of foreign law,
and analyzing the effects that adopting the different reciprocity for-
mulations would have, will allow a more complete evaluation of the
desirability of adopting a reciprocity requirement.
III
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING OF FOREIGN
COMPETITION STATUTES, PRACTICES
AND POLICIES
It is a long settled rule that "a foreign nation is generally enti-
tled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United
100. But see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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States." 103 Thus, the use of a reciprocity standard to exclude some
countries from standing in private antitrust suits must be viewed as
an exception to the general rule. Incorporating a reciprocity require-
ment into the Clayton Act, absent a thorough examination of its
practical effects, would contradict the United States policy which
requires that all legislation be the result of a deliberate and informed
process of legislative inquiry. This section of the Note focuses on the
impact that a reciprocity requirement would have on standing under
existing foreign antitrust law. 104 Before assessing the practical
impact of a reciprocity requirement, however, two variables must be
fixed. First, one must come to a basic understanding of the foreign
substantive and procedural law relevant to preserving free competi-
tion. Second, a definition of reciprocity must be formulated. 0 5 The
following survey of foreign antitrust law provides the basis for deter-
mining what the likely practical effects of a reciprocity requirement
would be. The survey will include a sampling of the laws of devel-
oped countries' 0 6 and developing countries that already have anti-
trust laws, 0 7 as well as an examination of the law in those countries
that do not presently have antitrust laws.108 An examination of these
laws will assist in determining which countries would be denied
standing in antitrust suits under a reciprocity requirement.
A. THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The antitrust or competition laws"°9 of the developed countries
103. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 318. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
104. Throughout the world, the body of antitrust law has grown rapidly in recent
years, and continued growth is likely. "Antitrust law and antitrust enforcement have
been and remain controversial subjects. Nevertheless, despite debates on this subject
within nations and between them, there are signs indicating growing acceptance of the
basic desirability of regulating anticompetitive practices." J. Davidow,Antitrust, Interna-
tional Policy, and Merger Control, Remarks at the Federal Bar Association Conference
on Antitrust and International Mergers and Acquisitions (August 28, 1980), reprinted in
DEP'T OF JusTIcE ANTITRUST DIVISION RELEASES 1 (August 28, 1980).
105. This Note attempts to take merely the first step in determining what the practical
effects of a reciprocity requirement will be. In addition to these two variables, a third
variable assumes importance: the reactions of foreign nations to the enactment of a reci-
procity requirement. Thus, whether any countries will change their laws in order to meet
the reciprocity requirement remains an important question. While any attempt to predict
foreign reactions is subject to extreme uncertainty, some factors suggest that at least a few
foreign nations would not change their antitrust laws merely to gain standing rights in
the courts of the United States. See supra notes 72-77 & 85-87 and accompanying text.
106. The countries of Europe, including the EEC, its national subparts and the Scan-
dinavian countries, Japan, and Canada will be examined.
107. India will be examined as a representative country which has started developing
a body of antitrust law.
108. This group consists of approximately 100 countries that have little or no antitrust
law. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
109. Antitrust law is often referred to abroad as the "Law of Competition" or compe-
tition law. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at ix.
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are of primary concern to the United States because two-thirds of its
foreign investment is made in Canada and EEC member states." s0
1. Antitrust Laws of the European Nations
The United States has the most comprehensive and strictly
enforced statutory scheme of antitrust law in the world."' Thus,
while other countries have modeled their antitrust laws on those of
the United States," 2 variations and gaps exist in foreign antitrust
laws when compared to their United States counterparts. Total uni-
formity is the exception rather than the rule.
Virtually all antitrust and competition laws condemn similar
acts: price fixing, market allocations, and customer allocation
among competitors.'I3 These similarities, however, can "mask sig-
nificant variations in philosophy and approach.""I 4 For example,
the United States is the only nation that outlaws the intentional
securing of a monopoly.1' 5 In contrast, the European countries do
not view the existence of a monopoly as improper in itself; these
countries punish only the abuse of a company's "dominant posi-
tion." 16 This difference in approach probably stems from differ-
ences in the policies underlying the laws. United States antitrust
110. Id. at 190.
111. Id. at viii.
112. Id. at ix.
113. Further, "[m]ost condemn resale price maintenance, tying agreements and some
forms of exclusive dealing requirements." Davidow, Foreign & International Antitrust:
Variations on the Themes of U.S. Law, Remarks at Eleventh New England Antitrust
Conference (November 18, 1977), reprinted in DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION
RELEASES 2 (November 18, 1977).
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
116. "Dominant position" is the European equivalent to a monopolistic position in
the antitrust vocabulary of the United States. The Europeans, however, have developed
stricter rules regarding the definition of a monopolistic position than those developed in
the United States. "Under English, German or Common Market law it is possible to
conclude that a firm enjoys a dominant position in a market with as little as 25%, 33% or
40%, respectively, of that market-as compared to 67% as a classic United States figure."
Davidow, supra note 113, at 3. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "undertakings
to exploit in an improper manner a dominantposition within the common market or within
a substantial part of it." 298 U.N.T.S. (1958) (emphasis added). For the full text of
Article 86, see infra note 138. A logical reading of Article 86 suggests that attaining a
monopoly or dominant position is not, by itself, prohibited; the law condemns only the
abuse of that position.
In Spain, for example, "[t]he existence of a monopolistic situation is not ipso facto
condemned, but abuse of it is." Price Waterhouse, DOING BUSINESS IN SPAIN 21 (1980).
Further, "Swedish antitrust law is based upon the belief that restraints on competition do
not necessarily have harmful effects. The 'rule of reason' is the governing principle." A.
WALSH & J. PAXTON, COMPETITION POLICY 162 (1975). Additionally, the EEC competi-
tion law has noper se illegalities; rather, the impact of restraints is examined closely. A
significant impact may indicate an antitrust problem exists. Comment,A Survey of4nti-
trust Law in the European Economic Community, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV., 535, 540
(1976). See also infra note 174.
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policy is centered around the belief that competition rather than con-
centration yields the best returns. Perfect competition, it is believed,
would result in a proper allocation of resources, lower production
costs, and lower prices to the consumer. Other developed countries
have not placed this same faith in pure competition."17 Rather, the
benefits resulting from the economies of scale that are achieved by
larger enterprises are viewed more favorably in other nations than
they are in the United States. The more lenient EEC competition
law, for example, allows practices that promote efficiency but do not
hinder the EEC's goal of market integration. 18
Developed nations almost universally believe that antitrust laws
are necessary.1 9 Most of these countries outlaw the same general
types of conduct that are outlawed in the United States.' 20 Some
areas of United States antitrust laws, however, either have no coun-
terparts or are only superficially addressed by foreign laws. For
example, while the United States has a strict law against price dis-
crimination,' 2' such conduct has not been universally prohibited.
France enacted a price discrimination law in 1975, "but French offi-
cials had so little sympathy for the law that they declined to be
involved in enforcing it."122 Such dissimilarities or gaps are more
117. For example, Japan has recognized that industry concentration results in some
benefits.
The history of [Japan's] Antimonopoly Act, . . . has been one of government
and business hostility and hence shrinking applicability. Japanese leaders have
viewed die Act's emphasis on competition at an impediment to the creation of a
strong national economy ... The close cooperation between the Japanese gov-
ernment, business management, and labor has led to a substantial degree of con-
centration in big business... and to the re-establishment of gigantic business
structures similar to the prewar zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and so
on).
KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 259.
118. EEC competition law does not adhere to rigid notions as to the efficacy of
pure competition as both a means to and an end embodying economic and polit-
ical good, as does its American counterpart. Community law is extremely
flexible in allowing practices which promote efficiency while not hindering the
goal of market integration.
Comment, supra note 116, at 538.
119. "[E]very country in noncommunist Europe except Turkey has some type of
restrictive business practices legislation presently on the books or under consideration."
Knm ER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 1. The degree of development of the different
national antitrust laws varies, however. Germany, for example, has moved swiftly to
enact comprehensive national competition laws, see supra note 123, while Italian compe-
tition law is largely limited to the antimonopoly policy developed by the EEC, see supra
note 143.
120. The United Kingdom, for example, prohibits concerted activities and agreements
between competitors in restraint of trade. These restrictions are comparable to the
prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 227.
121. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
122. Davidow, supra note 113, at 5-6. Another difference between the antitrust poli-
cies of the United States and France lies in the area of merger control. "MIthe United
States is prepared to prevent mergers creating a firm with 10% to 20% of a concentrated
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pronounced in some countries than in others. The laws vary in
scope, ranging from the highly developed antitrust laws of West
Germany 2 3 to the almost nonexistent antitrust laws of Belgium. 124
Finally, the concept of antitrust is alien to the economic systems of
the Eastern European Communist countries, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union.
125
A body of antitrust law similar to that of the United States
becomes meaningful only if it is enforced. In addition to substantive
variations between the United States antitrust laws and foreign com-
petition codes, numerous procedural differences among the many
laws 126 result in varied levels of enforcement. An important proce-
dural question involves the existence of a private right of action for
damages resulting from antitrust violations.
The general character of foreign enforcement procedures differs
from methods used in the United States. 27 Instead of employing
industry. . . . [In contrast,] France adopted merger control only in June of 1977, and
will examine only those mergers involving more than 40% control of a relevant market."
Id. at 4.
123. Germany has developed antitrust laws that are similar to those of the United
States because many of the philosophies underlying United States antitrust law are
accepted in Germany. "The general philosophy underlying competition policy and the
laws adopted to give effect to it, show some similarities. . . between the United States
and West Germany." ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSEN SHAFT, COMPETI-
TION POLICY: GERMAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 385 (1980). Germany first enacted
its antitrust laws in 1958. Responsibility for enforcement of these laws vests in the Fed-
eral Cartel office in Berlin. The Office "has refused to permit mergers in at least eleven
cases over the past four years [1974-78]. The authority. . . also [deals] with restraints of
competition such as the fixing of retail prices and uniform conditions of sale." PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY 16 (1978).
124. Presently, Belgium has neither monopoly nor antitrust laws. "However, the law
of May 27, 1960 includes a provision prohibiting undertakings from exploiting a domi-
nant position in an improper manner. This provision is in line with Article 86 of the
[Treaty of Rome, the treaty] implementing the EEC." PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING
BUSINESS IN BELGIUM 13 (1978). See infra note 138.
125. These countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and Cuba, have centralized,
planned systems, made possible because the government owns almost all industry.
Therefore, there is no need for antitrust laws. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, ANTITRUST IN EAST-WEST TRADE
(An Excerpt from Meeting of the Advisory Committee on East-West Trade), 2-4 (March
10, 1976).
126. As one commentator recognizes, "there is as much need for improvement and
harmonization in regard to antitrust procedures internationally as [there is] in regard to
substantive rules." Davidow, supra note 113, at 12.
127. "In contrast to some of the conceptual similarities between United States and
European substantive antitrust law. . . . EEC procedure differs dramatically from the
United States procedure. [For example,] [tihe EEC's procedures are administrative."
Reeves, European Antitrust Law: A Nontechnical Overly Simploed Introduction, ANTI-
TRUST 7 (ABA) Vol. 1, No. 4 (1978). The emphasis on administrative procedures has
resulted in a more flexible approach regarding prohibited practices. "Great use is made
of administrative procedures in the application of EEC competition law, and it is through
these procedures that many forms of cooperation are allowed, including joint marketing
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rigid enforcement mechanisms, most developed countries rely on
more flexible and informal voluntary methods of "enforcement," but
describe these mechanisms with terms such as "negotiation,"
"inquiry," and "arbitration." Sweden has adopted this approach.
Swedish law empowers a Freedom of Commerce Ombudsman to
supervise compliance with the law. If he believes a certain restraint
is harmful, he may "negotiate with the Company to eliminate the
problem."'128 If unsuccessful, he can bring the matter to a special
court (Marknodsdemstolen) where the "negotiations" continue. 29
Thus, the law lacks strict enforcement mechanisms; it lacks rigid
rules backed by criminal and civil sanctions.
Other European nations also fail to enforce their antitrust laws
strictly. In Finland, the Competition Ombudsman Office may settle
disputes "concerning harmful effects of restrictive practices"' 30
through arbitration. The Netherlands competition law requires that
all agreements in the field of competition be disclosed to the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs and entered in the nonpublic cartel regis-
ter.' 3' Failure to file such agreements may be punished by both a
fine and imprisonment for up to six years. 32 In practice, however,
"[t]he Act has been rarely invoked. . .,and case law is minimal."'133
While differences in the enforcement mechanisms of the devel-
oped countries are important, a more vital concern focuses on who
may initiate these procedures; in other words, who has standing to
bring these claims. Eleven developed countries currently allow civil
actions for damages.' 34 The existence of standing and the availabil-
ity of a private remedy, however, fail to indicate the actual use of
these measures. In fact, private suits for damages do not comprise
the major method of enforcement in many of these countries. For
example, while English law normally provides a civil remedy for the
agreements, and joint research and development agreements." Comment, supra note
116, at 537.
128. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SWEDEN 12 (1980). In certain cases,
an injured party may seek relief on its own. "If in a certain case the Ombudsman decides
not to initiate negotiations, an entrepreneur who is directly affected by the restraint of
competition in question, or an association of consumers or employees, may apply for the
institution of negotiations." GUIDE TO LEGISLATION IN RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-
TICES, Sweden, at z, Vol. V (1971).
129. DOING BUSINESS IN SWEDEN, supra note 128, at 12.
130. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN FINLAND 10 (1980).
131. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS 21 (1980).
132. The Economic Offenses Act provides for these sanctions. Id.
133. Id. The normal practice is that the parties confer with the Ministry before mak-
ing an agreement, and "in the past, cartels and other groups have acceded to the views of
the Ministry." Id. at 21-22.
134. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-
TICES (Civil action here means a private suit for damages).
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breach of any statutory duty,135 English antitrust law demonstrates a
negative attitude toward such claims when they are based on viola-
tions of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. 13
6
2. Antitrust Laws of the European Economic Community
The antitrust program of the Common Market incorporates a
two-tiered legal system. The national antitrust laws of the member
countries 137 comprise the first tier; the second tier consists of the
antitrust law adopted by the Community as a whole. The antitrust
law of the EEC is embodied in Articles 85 and 86138 of the EEC
Statute Clearly Statute Does Not
Authorizes Authorize Ambiguous
1. Canada Denmark Belgium
2. France Sweden Finland
3. Germany United Kingdom* Ireland**
4. Japan Austria
5. Netherlands Greece






*Suit for damages due to the operation of an unregistered agreement is authorized.
**In general, a party may sue for damages if injured by a breach of a statutory duty.
Source: Compiled from ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (1978).
135. D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL, & J. JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 131 (1975).
136. In this connection it may be mentioned that ... actions for damages by third
parties do not play a role in the enforcement of restrictive practices legislation in
England ....
It is interesting to contrast the uncertain position under EEC law regarding
third party claims and the negative attitude to such claims under English anti-
trust law with the situation in the USA where the possibility of claims for penal
triple damages at the suit of third parties prejudiced by breach of the anti-trust
laws is perhaps the main deterrent against their infringement.
Id. at 136. See also Rew, Actions for Damages by Third Parties Under English Lawfor
Breach of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 46 (1971).
137. Members of the EEC are West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Greece. The first six
countries were the original members. Comment, supra note 116, at 535 & n.l.
138. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298




(1) The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Mar-
ket and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any
decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are
likely to affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
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Treaty (Treaty of Rome).139 The EEC's antitrust laws primarily
attempt to maximize free competition. Article 85 prohibits practices
"which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition."'' 40 This commits all signatories of the EEC to an
antimonopoly policy. The interrelationship between the law of the
EEC and the laws of its member nations, however, remains complex.
The enforcement of the competition rules and regulations of the
EEC rests primarily with the Commission of the European Commu-
result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market, in particular those consisting in:
a.) The direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
b.) The limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
c.) Market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
d.) The application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
e.) The subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party
of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
null and void.
(3) Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph I may be declared inapplicable in
the case of-
-any agreement or classes of agreements between enterprises;
-any decision or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to
the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion
of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share in
the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
a. neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensa-
ble to the attainment of the above objectives;
b. nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substan-
tial proportion of the goods concerned.
Article 86
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected
thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dom-
inant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall
be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall thereby be
prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular consist in:
a. the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices
or of other inequitable trading conditions;
b. the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
c. the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
d. the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of
additional supplies which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contract.
139. Officially known as the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958). See supra note 138.
140. Treaty of Rome, supra note 138, art. 85(1).
8]RECIPROCITY
nities.141 Articles 85 and 86, however, are considered part of the
national law of the member states. Thus, they can be enforced in the
national courts. 142 Further, if a conflict between national and EEC
law exists, Community law prevails. For some countries, EEC com-
petition law becomes, in effect, the national antitrust law. 143 Finally,
the broad definitions contained in Articles 85 and 86 have resulted in
an "extensive body of administrative rules [that has] . . . become
almost as important as the articles themselves."' 144
EEC competition law authorizes the Commission to initiate
administrative proceedings to determine whether any violations of
Article 85 or Article 86 have occurred. 145 "The commission may ini-
tiate the. . . proceedings. . . either ex officio or upon the complaint
of a member state or of any natural or legal persons who claim a
legitimate interest."' 146 The EEC competition rules contain no provi-
sion for private damage actions; creation of that right lies solely with
the national laws.147 Thus, a person may sue for damages in a
national court only under national laws that permit such suits.
148
3. The Antitrust Laws of Japan
Japan's antitrust law has developed through an attempt to bal-
ance two often conflicting factors: an awareness of the dangers of
concentration and a traditional tolerance of considerable collective
action and collusion. 149 Article 1 of Japan's Law Relating to Prohi-
bition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade
states the purpose of the law:
This Law, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of
trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the excessive concentration
of power over enterprises, and by excluding undue restriction of production,
141. The Commission is an executive body responsible for enforcing the laws of the
EEC. Treaty of Rome, supra note 138, art. 155.
142. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 192.
143. This is the case in Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium, where there appears to be no
national body of antitrust law. See DoINo BUSINESS IN BELGIUM, supra note 124, at 13;
PRICE WATERHOUSE, GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG 14 (1977); See also ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON
RESTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES (1978). For many of the restrictive business practices
listed, Belgium had "no specific legislation on [the] subject." .d. at 7, 21, 27, 33, 85, 99,
109. Further, Italy and Luxembourg were not even listed in the survey.
144. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS ABROAD IN THE COMMON MARKET 47
(1978).
145. Council Regulation 17, art. 3, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) § 2421 (1971).
146. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 192.
147. 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) §§ 2041.70, 2041.90, 2041.95 (1973).
148. This delegation to national law of the issue of standing to sue for damages should
not be interpreted to mean that the EEC opposes such suits. Rather, "[t]he commission
. . stated that such actions for damages could usefully supplement its own enforcement
efforts." KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 193.
149. See WALSH & PAXTON, supra note 116, at 158.
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sale, price, technology, etc., through combinations, agreements, etc. and all
other unreasonable restraints of business activities, aims to promote free and
fair competition .... and thereby to promote the democratic and whole-
some development of national economy as well as to assure the interest of the
general consumer. [emphasis added]
150
This Antimonopoly Act has five major substantive provisions. They
focus on the following areas: private monopolization (Section 3),
unreasonable restraint of trade (Section 3), unfair business practices
(Section 19), restrictions on the concentration of economic power,
and international contracts (Section 6).151
On its face, the Japanese statutory scheme seems to adopt the
same underlying principles and prohibit the same conduct as the
antitrust law of the United States. 52 In practice, however, its
"[a]pproach to monopolies and restrictive practices. . . varies from
that of Europe and the United States in that the government and the
business world accept considerable collective action and collusion as
a normal form of business activity."' 153 Procedurally, Japan allows
for the "indemnification of damages to the person or party
injured."' 54 Further, a strict liability standard is imposed on the
accused. One must only demonstrate that the accused employed the
proscribed practice, and that the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result
of the accused's activities. 55
4. The Antitrust Laws of Canada
While antitrust legislation has only recently been adopted by
most foreign nations, Canada's initial antitrust legislation actually
preceded the Sherman Act of 1890. Further, Canada adheres to the
same general philosophy that underlies the antitrust laws of the
United States: competition will lead to the optimum amount of
production.
150. EHS (Eibun-Horei-Sha) Law Bulletin Series, Volume II, Part III. Commercial
Cases, K-Unfair Competition, at KAZ (1980).
151. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 254-58.
152. Id. at 252. "This similarity is not coincidental... [At the end of World War II,]
the U.S. occupation authority, General MacArthur, specifically directed the Japanese
government to enact a law which would eliminate and prevent private monopoly and
restraint of trade." Id. at 252-53.
153. WALSH & PAXTON, supra note 116, at 158.
154. CHAPTER VII Indemnification of Damages (Absolute liability) 13
Article 25. Any entrepreneur who has effected private monopolization or
unreasonable restraint of trade or who has employed unfair business practices,
shall be liable for indemnjlcation of damages to the person or party injured.
2. No entrepreneur may be exempted from the liability as prescribed in the
preceding paragraph by showing the non-existence of wllfulness or negligence on
his part.




The philosophy behind the Canadian and United States laws was essen-
tially that the establishment of an economic environment in which all busi-
ness enterprises could freely and fairly compete would usually result in the
best allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress which would be to the benefit of society as
a whole.
156
Both Canada and the United States recognize that it is impor-
tant that national antitrust laws work without conflict in the interna-
tional arena. 157 Because of the growing interdependence between
these two countries and the joint Canadian-United States market
area, the similar philosophy underlying the antitrust laws of both
countries has important practical significance today.158 Despite both
the early enactment of an anti-combines law in Canada 59 and philo-
sophical underpinnings that are similar to those found in the laws of
United States, Canadian antitrust enforcement failed to develop as
swiftly as its counterpart in the United States.
160
Canada's Federal Anticombines Investigation Act closely
resembles section one of the Sherman Act. It makes any combina-
tion or conspiracy that prevents or unduly diminishes competition
unlawful.' 6' Until recently, however, the provision has rarely been
enforced. The number of "[m]onopolistic situations [that] have not
been investigated or whose investigation has been dropped at an
early stage ha[s] remained large in comparison with those that have
156. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat, Considera-
tions For the Drafting of a Model Law or Laws on Restrictive Business Practices to Assist
Developing Countries in Devising Appropriate Legislation, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 831, 833
(1977). "The Canadian Law of 1889 and the American Sherman Act of 1890 were polit-
ical and almost theological expressions of the traditional aspiration for equality of oppor-
tunity and freedom of enterprise." Brault, Current Developments in Competition Policies,
22 ANTITRUST BULL. 157 (1977).
157. "In those cases in which the national laws affecting such practices have not been
interpreted similarly, the partners [U.S. and Canada] will take appropriate action to har-
monize their interpretations when such practices prove to be interfering with competition
between the partner countries." CANADIAN-AMERICAN COMMITrEE, PLAN FOR A
CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AREA 8-9 (1965).
158. A joint Canadian American Committee was created in 1957 to study problems
arising from the growing interdependence between Canada and the United States. The
dangers of restrictive business practices were recognized. "Incompatible with meaningful
free trade are agreements between enterprises ... that have the result of preventing,
restricting, or distorting competition within the joint Canadian-U.S. market area." Id., at
8.
159. The Canadian term for antitrust is anti-combines.
160. For example, Canadian merger policy has followed a different directionthan its
United States counterpart. "Although Canada was one of the first countries to legislate
against combines, the extent of investigation and enforcement activity [prior to 1950] has
been slight." G. ROSENBLUTH & H. THORBURN, CANADIAN ANTI-COMBINES ADMINIS-
TRATION 1952-1960 (1963).
161. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BusrNEss IN CANADA 32 (1979).
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been effectively dealt with."'162 Thus, unlike mergers in the United
States, Canadian mergers have benefited from a presumption of
legality.163
Yet, "[r]ecent Canadian government actions have signaled
changes both in actual and anticipated merger policy."'16 For exam-
ple, recent amendments to the Anticombines Act would require gov-
ernment approval of any merger "likely to lessen" competition.1 65
Thus, Canadian and United States merger policies promise to
demonstrate greater similarity today than they previously have.
Although there are some differences in the area of practice and
enforcement, antitrust development in Canada and the United States
has been remarkably similar. Substantively and philosophically,
these countries have developed their antitrust laws in almost com-
plete harmony. Further, Canada is one of only a handful of coun-
tries besides the United States where antitrust laws are rigorously
enforced.
166
B. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH ANTITRUST LAWS
About half of the larger developing nations 67 now have some
form of antitrust laws.' 68 These laws are mainly in an early stage of
development. Some larger developing countries, however, have not
developed their antitrust laws in a meaningful way.
169
162. ROSENBLUTH & THORBURN, supra note 160, at 100. The authors further point
out that 'Judicial interpretations suggest that a merger can be attacked under the legisla-
tion only if it eliminates virtually all competition." Id.
163. "It is generally accepted that Canadian laws have accorded mergers a prima facie
legal status. Specifically only in the narrow case of the establishment of a complete
monopoly, or in cases of anticompetitive business conduct like price fixing, has the pre-
sumption of legality been rebuttable." Globerman, Canada's Changing Merger Environ-
ment, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 519 (1979).
164. Further, the Canadian government has considered legislation that would extend
the present legislative rules against monopolistic practices and other practices that may
injure consumers. DOING BusINEss IN CANADA, supra note 161, at 32 (1979).
165. Proposed changes in merger law introduced by recent amendments to the
Combines Act require mergers that lessen or are likely to lessen substantially,
actual or potential competition and that, in the case of horizontal mergers, result
in the combined market share of the merged parties exceeding 20 percent, to be
brought by the Competition Policy Advocate before a Competition Board.
Globerman, supra note 163, at 520.
166. Davidow, International Antitrust Codes: The Post-Acceptance Phase, 26 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 567 (1981).
167. This group includes such nations as India, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, the Philip-
pines, and possibly Yugoslavia.
168. Davidow, The UNCT4D Restrictive Business Practices Code, Remarks at the
International Conference on Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises (July 16, 1979), reprinted in DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION
RELEASES, at 2 (July 16, 1979); see White, Recent Developments in the Control of Restric-
tive Business Practices in Latin America, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/1F (1978).
169. Mexico is one country which has not developed antitrust law in a meaningful
way. While an Article of the Mexican Constitution "prohibits agreements between busi-
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India, a country in the midst of developing antitrust law, will be
used as an example of the countries within this latter category. Its
law is drawn, to a large degree, from the antitrust laws of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the other developed countries.
70
Its principle antitrust legislation, The Monopolies and Restrictive
Trade Practices Act (MRTP) of 1969,171 is defined as "[a]n act to
provide that the operation of the economic system does not result in
the concentration of economic power to the common detriment, for
the control of monopolies, [and] for the prohibition of monopolistic
and restrictive trade practices."1 72 Thus, the policy underlying
Indian antitrust law is in agreement with the philosophy behind its
counterpart in the United States. Further, the trend in India's devel-
opment of substantive antitrust law seems to track United States law
closely. The Sachar Committee Report, 173 the publication of an
antitrust advisory group, suggested that all monopolistic trade prac-
tices be proscribed. It suggested that the following practices be pro-
hibited: "collective discrimination, boycott, collective bidding,
resale price maintenance. . ., price discrimination, tie-up sales [tie-
ins], exclusive dealings, [and] production sharing. ... 174.
nessmen or other monopolistic practices resulting in increasing or fixing prices to the
public.. .[these rules have not often been invoked." PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING Busi-
Nss IN Mmxco (1981).
170. Indian law on the subject of monopolies and restrictive trade practices draws
heavily upon the laws as embodied in the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act in
the USA; the Monopolies Act, 1948, Resale Price Maintenance Act, 1956 and the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1957 in UK; and as also those found in Japan,
Canada, and Germany.
S. G PrE, MRTP: A COMPENDIUM, at 1/3 (1974).
171. It was amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1974. Also, in August,
1978 a committee known as the Sachar Committee (High-powered Expert Committee on
the Companies and MRTP Acts) issued a report suggesting further amendments. See
Singh, Law of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices, 14 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
INDIAN LAW 40 (1978).
172. GurrE, supra note 170, at 111/5.
(o) "restrictive trade practice" means a trade practice which has, or may have,
the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition in any manner
and in particular,-
(i) which tends to obstruct the flow of capital or resources into the stream
of production, or
(ii) which tends to bring about manipulation of prices, or conditions of
delivery or to affect the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods
or services in such manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified
costs or restrictions;
id. at III/Il.
173. See supra note 171.
174. Singh, supra note 171, at 69. Initially, many of these restrictive trade practices
were treated asperse violations, as is done in the United States. In T.E.L. Co. v. Regis-
trar of Restrictive Trade Agreements, 1977 A.I.R. (S.C.) 973, however, India's Supreme
Court held that the question of whether a trade practice is restrictive or not must be
decided by applying the rule of reason and not theperse doctrine. "[Tihe concept of per
se unreasonableness means that once courts have had sufficient experience with certain
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While similarities with United States substantive law are pres-
ent, important variations exist between India's procedural enforce-
ment mechanism and that of the United States. India delegates
responsibility for antitrust law enforcement to the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (hereinafter the Commis-
sion).175 As is common in most developing countries, the Commis-
sion comprises the sole mechanism for antitrust enforcement. 76 A
civil action for damages has not yet been provided as a supplemental
types of conduct, they will conclusively presume that such conduct is unreasonable and
therefore illegal." KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 9, at 206. Alternatively, the Court in
TELCO defined rule of reason as follows:
(A) restriction as to area or price will not per se be a restrictive trade prac-
tice. Every trade agreement restrains or binds persons or places or prices. The
question is whether the restraint is such as regulates and thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine this question three matters are to be considered. First, what facts are
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied. Second, what was the
condition before and after the restraint is imposed. Third, what is the nature of
the restraint and what is its actual probable effect.
1977 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 979.
Prior to the TELCO decision, India was one of the few foreign countries applying aper
se standard. For example, "there are no per se illegalities in EEC competition law."
Comment, note 116, at 540. Japan originally adopted theperse approach to restraints of
trade. KiNTNER & JOELSON supra note 9, at 255. The trend, however, has been away
from the per se approach. "[A]mendments to the [Antimonopoly] Act have deleted the
stringent per se prohibitions of the original legislation or have replaced per se rules with
a test of reasonableness. . . ." Id. at 259.
175. The Commission has the powers of a civil court.
Powers of the Commission
12. (1) The Commission shall, for the purposes of any inquiry under this Act
have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following mat-
ters, namely:--
(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining
him on oath;
(b) the discovery and production of any document or other material object pro-
ducible as evidence;
(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(d) the requisitioning of any public record from any court or office;
(e) the issuing of any commission for the examination of witnesses.
(2) Any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860), and the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court for the
purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (5 of 1898).
S. GuPTE, supra note 170, at Ill/15. The Commission may inquire into such areas as
restrictive trade practices, monopolistic trade practices, and concentration of economic
power. Id.
176. "In developing countries, it is not infrequent that responsibility for deciding
whether a restrictive agreement is acceptable will be vested in a single administrative
official who has no obligation to hold hearings of any particular type." Davidow, supra
note 113, at 11.
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means of enforcement. 177 The Sachar Committee has recom-
mended, however, that such a private right of action be instituted.1 78
While a handful of larger developing countries are making sig-
nificant strides in the development of a viable body of antitrust law,
no developing country currently provides for a private right of
action.179 Many developing countries, as exemplified by India, have
modeled their substantive laws on United States antitrust provisions.
Although the substance and philosophy of these laws may be similar,
enforcement mechanisms have not followed United States methods.
C. COUNTRIES WITHOUT ANTITRUST LAWS
Today many countries still have no antitrust laws. 180 Many of
these nations, especially the developing countries, rarely experience
the problems caused by purely domestic anticompetitive practices.
These problems are not present because of the nature and size of the
economies of these nations.1 81 This, however, does not diminish the
amount of injury suffered from antitrust violations originating from
conspiracies abroad. While many of these developing countries have
little need for domestic antitrust laws, they need access to the courts
of other nations, especially those of the developed countries, to
recover compensation for injuries suffered. Only then can they
attempt to eliminate the anticompetitive practices that produce
harmful effects within their borders.
Generally, it is unlikely that these nations will develop a viable
body of national antitrust law. Perhaps the only hope for the intro-
duction of antitrust law into these countries lies with the develop-
ment of antitrust law at the supranational level. The developing
countries played an important role at the United Nations Confer-
ence on Restrictive Business Practices (UNCRBP), concluded on
177. Referring to the Pfizer decision, an Indian law professor stated that India has "no
parallel provision regarding payment of damages at the instance of any "person" as
such." Singh, supra note 171, at 41.
178. Commenting on the institution of such a right of action, the Committee stated
that it would be a "novel provision. . . for the award of damages not only at the instance
of an individual [citing the treble damages provision of the Clayton Act] but also through
a class action." Id. at 79.
179. Brazil, Columbia, Yugoslavia, and Israel seem to be the only developing coun-
tries that provide for such an action. S. RPp. No. 239, supra note 38, at 48 (Statement of
Assistant Attorney General Ewing).
180. While approximately 90 percent of all developed countries and about half of the
larger developing countries currently have some form of antitrust legislation, perhaps as
many as one hundred smaller countries have no antitrust laws at all. Davidow, The
UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587, 588 (1979). See also
White, supra note 168.
181. The government of Papua New Guinea, for example, believes the nation's rela-
tively small market makes it presently inappropriate to introduce antimonopoly legisla-
tion. PRiCE WATERHOUSE, DOING BusNsS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1 (1979).
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April 22, 1980.182 A "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Princi-
ples and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices" was
adopted by the Conference.' 83 This set of Agreed Principles and
Rules may help fill the void that exists due to the lack of national
antitrust legislation in the developing countries. 8 4 Thus, "[i]f states
respect their obligations as enumerated in the Agreed Principles and
Rules, states will enforce the code through their national legal Machin-
ery."' 8 5 The question remains, however, whether these countries will
enforce the Agreed Principles and Rules vigorously, or whether they
will become an empty agreement to which no nation adheres. Yet,
the real importance of the Principles and Rules lies in the possibility
that, in time, they may provide a basis for the development of sub-
stantive antitrust laws in the countries presently without any such
laws.18 6 Substantively, the code "incorporates the general division
between agreements in restraint of trade and monopolization con-
tained in sections one and two. . . of the Sherman Act."' 1 7 Due to
the significant differences in outlook among the countries of the
182. See Oesterle, supra note 67, at 2-4, 44; United Nations Conference on Restrictive
Business Practices, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for
the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP Conf./10 (1980).
183. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the set of "Agreed Principles
and Rules" on December 5, 1980. See Oesterle, supra note 67, at 55.
184. The committees that performed the preparatory work for the UNCTAD Confer-
ence received a mandate to identify "restrictive business practices likely to injure interna-
tional trade, particularly the trade and development of developing countries" and to
formulate "a model antitrust law for developing countries." Davidow, supra note 180, at
589; UNCTAD Res. 91 (IV) (May 30, 1976).
185. Oesterle, supra note 67, at 7 (emphasis added).
186. Thus, the ultimate importance of the UNCTAD Code can be measured only by
its interpretation and use over time. The immediate impact of the passage of the
UNCTAD Code is likely to be minimal. Its importance lies in the possibility that it will
serve as a starting point for the gradual development of antitrust law at the international
level and as a course for the expansion of antitrust laws at the national level:
[W]hile U.N. adoption of the Principles and Rules may deter a few practices,
particularly in transactions with developing countries, the provisions win have
significant effect only as a gradual process of formal or informal interpretation
develops or as they are embraced or copied in national or regional law that is effec-
tivey enforcible.
Davidow, International Antitrust Codes: The Post-Acceptance Phase, 26 ANTITRUST
BULL. 567, at 590 (1981) (emphasis added). In the short-run, nations are likely to imple-
ment provisions of the UNCTAD Code in their courts only when their national interests
would be benefited:
Presumably, nations will favor or implement strict rules only when their interests
in eliminating certain practices actually coincide ... [For example], some states,
particularly the United States, would generally take the position that an agree-
ment restraining trade and competition made without government approval is
evil regardless of whether the restraint was in fact harmless, or even arguably in
the national interest. Other States would have very little bias against private
trade restraints per se, evaluating them after the fact in terms of their effects.
Davidow, supra note 180, at 601-02.
187. Oesterle, supra note 67, at 4. The language of the Agreed Principles and Rules is
unique. The Agreed Principles and Rules emphasize a policy substantially different from
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world, however, the Code is filled with "vague, imprecise, [and]
largely untested concepts and definitions."'' 88 Thus, it is not likely
that this set of Agreed Principles and Rules will have much practical
impact on countries presently without antitrust laws. 189
D. SUMMARY
This overview of world antitrust law indicates that a number of
similarities as well as differences exist between foreign competition
law and United States antitrust law.190 Further, when compared
with their counterparts in the United States, the differences between
the procedural enforcement mechanisms and the remedies that are
available for antitrust violations in foreign countries appear to be
other antitrust codes; it attempts to meet "the social needs and political demands of
developing countries vis-a-vis developed countries." Id. at 44.
188. Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Codefor Competition?
13 INT'L LAW. 607, 608 (1979). Thus, the meanings of the substantive elements within the
Code are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty:
The problem is that one simply does not know what content the terms will be
given in the UNCTAD Code. These terms necessarily have much clearer mean-
ing within the context of a unified system such as that of the EEC, where rules of
competition form part of the law of each member state and are enforced by the
Commission throughout the Community, than in the widely differing contexts
and economic and political systems of the member countries of UNCTAD.
Id. at 610-611.
Further, unlike the Commission of the EEC, there is no enforcement mechanism at the
international or regional level to secure compliance with the UNCTAD Code, and the
likelihood that such a mechanism will be created in the immediate future is slim. "[N]o
regional group participating in the RBP negotiation has recommended, or seems likely to
support, the creation of an enforcement agency at the international level." Davidow,
supra note 180, at 601.
189. One commentator believes that "[ilt would be dangerous... to accord to these
general principles (which are frequently no more than polite statements of disagreement)
any greater authority than that of voluntary guidelines or signposts for the continuing
process of international education in and acceptance of competition as a rule of business
conduct." Gill, supra note 188, at 615.
Another commentator believes that the developed countries viewed the UNCTAD
Conference as merely an arena to exchange information, and not as the place for realiz-
ing the more ambitious goal of developing a binding model antitrust code. He believes
that the actual benefits of the UNCTAD restrictive business practice exercise, for the
developed countries, has been the actual process of exchanging information. He claims
that these countries do not believe an inflexible Code, resulting from a one-time interna-
tional agreement, is a feasible way of presently dealing with restrictive business practices.
"Rather, it is believed that a gradual exchange of information and experience, compari-
son of legislation and enforcement. . . will, over time,. . . facilitate bilateral coopera-
tion and consultation. . . ." Davidow, supra note 180, at 603.
190. Presently, many of the developed countries prohibit most of the conduct that is
prohibited in the United States. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, for example,
are comparable to §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act. Generally, however, the antitrust laws
of other countries are not as comprehensive as those of the United States. The fact that
antitrust development in many of these countries is still in its early stages probably
accounts for this difference. For example:
[r]emedies for the abuses of free-market capitalism began in the United States
with the Sherman Act in 1890. The EEC's development of antitrust remedies did
not begin until 1957. As a result, antitrust law in the EEC has not fully devel-
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even greater than the variations in the substantive law.191 Thus,
applying a reciprocity standard that distinguishes between countries
with antitrust laws that are similar to those of the United States and
countries with laws that lack the requisite similarity would be diffi-
cult. A reciprocity standard that required foreign nations to grant
the United States Government standing to sue for damages resulting
from antitrust violations before those nations could bring antitrust
suits in United States courts would grant only a handful of foreign
countries access to the courts of the United States.1 92 In many coun-
tries that have an operative body of antitrust law, enforcement is
delegated to a governmental commission or agency. 93 Those bodies
then have the power to initiate complaints, conduct investigations,
and prescribe remedies. 194 Practically, these commissions and agen-
cies become the only mechanisms through which the antitrust laws
are enforced. Thus, differences between the enforcement mecha-
nisms of the United States and those of foreign nations lead to an
important consideration: how many countries will be denied anti-
trust standing in the courts of the United States if a reciprocity
requirement is imposed?
oped a body of [judicial] precedent similar to that which has evolved through 85
years of litigation in the United States.
Comment, supra note 116, at 589. The relatively recent enactment of antitrust statutes in
many countries indicates that, in time, such countries may develop a scheme of antitrust
laws as inclusive as that developed by the United States.
191. Statutory similarity can be only an initial inquiry. Differences between what
statutes proscribe and the provisions that nations actually enforce may be great. Further,
although textually similar, policies underlying the statutory schemes of other nations
may differ from the policies of the United States. "In short, each modem antitrust or
competition law can be fully understood only if one has some feeling for its appropriate
political, economic, and social, as well as legal, perspective." KINTNER & JOELSON,
supra note 9, at 7.
For example, although some of the antitrust laws of the United States and the
European Common Market are textually very similar, the Common Market
authorities attach much more importance to the goal of integrating their nine
national economies into a single economy capable of competing effectively with
the United States and Japan, than they attach to the goal of limiting market
power ....
Id. at 6-7. United States antitrust laws are designed to maintain free competition in the
domestic economy. Id. at 8.
192. For example, only 12 of the 17 countries of the OECD have statutory provisions
specifically allowing civil actions. See COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON
REsTRicTrVE BUSINESS PRACTICE, supra note 134, at 199-203.
193. See supra notes 123, 128-33 and accompanying text.
194. Some countries delegate these tasks to different agencies. In the United King-
dom, for example, the Director of Fair Trade may refer a suspected monopoly to the
Monopolies Commission for investigation. The Commission can then recommend that
remedies be instituted by the Department of Prices and Consumer Protection. See
WALSH & PA rON, supra note 116, at 142-48.
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THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF RECIPROCITY
An endless number of reciprocity standards may be devised.
This Note will focus on the effects of four different reciprocity for-
mulations, ranging from a strict or exclusive standard to a loose or
inclusive standard. 195 Any reciprocity standard, however, will pro-
vide a foreign nation standing only if that nation provides a similar
right to the United States. Under the various formulations of reci-
procity, the antitrust laws of a foreign nation must provide:
(1) standing for the United States government plus substantive anti-
trust law "formulated precisely like our own" ("strict reciprocity");
(2) standing for the United States and the prohibition of the same
"type -or category" of conduct that is prohibited by United States
antitrust law ("general reciprocity"); (3) proof of an intent or trend
on the part of the foreign government to ensure free trade and com-
petition; and (4) a mere showing of nondiscriminatory treatment of
the United States in the administration of either the foreign nation's
antitrust law or its general laws.196
A. STANDARD 1
"Strict reciprocity" requires that the antitrust laws of a foreign
country mirror those of the United States. Thus, the standing of for-
eign governments in antitrust actions would "depend on the exist-
ence of foreign laws formulated precisely like our own."'
197
Although United States antitrust law has been used as a model by
many other countries, no nation has antitrust laws exactly like those
195. Continuum of Reciprocity Standards
Std. I Std. 2 Std. 3 Std. 4
/ / / /
identical "type" intent/ no
substantive +standing trend discrimination
law + standing
Decreasing number of countries granted standing
An exclusive reciprocity standard refers to a requirement which is likely to deny the
majority of foreign nations standing in the United States.
196. Standard 4 grants standing to almost all foreign governments, effectively elimi-
nating any reciprocity requirement. This position reflects the Supreme Court's view in
izer. Standard 1 would deny all foreign nations standing. This standard formed the
basis of a bill proposed in the 95th Congress: H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1978)
(Clayton Act Amendments of 1978); it would preclude any damage actions by foreign
governments under § 4 of the Clayton Act.
197. 125 CONG. Rac. S. 990 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979) (Remarks of Mr. DeConcini). S.
2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) incorporated this formulation. Congress, however, did
not act on this proposed bill. See supra note 33.
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of the United States. 198 For example, treble damage relief andper se
rules' 99 are unique to the antitrust jurisprudence of the United
States.2°° Thus, a "strict reciprocity" requirement would deny access
to United States courts to all nations affected by antitrust violations.
Further, an attempt by the United States to force other sovereign
countries to adopt such rigidly defined antitrust laws would be inher-
ently unreasonable.
B. STANDARD 2
"General reciprocity" requires the foreign nation seeking stand-
ing in the United States to: (1) grant the United States Government
standing to bring antitrust suits in its courts; and (2) enact substan-
tive laws that prohibit the same "type or category" of anti-competi-
tive conduct that is proscribed in the United States.20' Thus,
standing would be granted to all countries that have "demonstrated
a commitment to the concepts embodied in ...U.S. antitrust
law., 202
Under this formulation, the antitrust laws of a foreign country
would not have to be "exactly like" those of the United States.
Rather, such laws would merely have to embody the same basic con-
cepts that underlie American antitrust law. Because the phrase "type
or category" is broad, most foreign countries that currently have
antitrust laws would satisfy the first criterion for standing under this
"general reciprocity" requirement. The EEC and the larger develop-
ing countries, for example, seem to prohibit the same general "type"
of conduct that is prohibited in the United States.20 3 Thus, approxi-
mately thirty-five countries would meet this initial requirement.20 4
In addition, many more nations, including many of the developing
countries, might be able to meet this requirement by implementing
198. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. If one compares the law of the
United States to a multinational instrument such as the AGREED RULES AND PRINCIPLES
OF Tm UNCRBP, the likelihood of finding laws "exactly like" those of the United States
decreases even more sharply. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
199. "Treble damage suits are unknown in Europe and any kind of private action in
this field is very rare." [1981] ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 996 at A-6
(Jan. 8, 1981). See supra notes 115-118, 174 and accompanying text.
200. Further, differences in the enforcement mechanisms used by other countries
might be the basis for failing the "strict reciprocity" standard. See supra notes 128-130
and accompanying text.
201. The Pfizer section of the Illinois Brick Bill, S. 300, supra note 33, incorporates
this standard of reciprocity. While the 96th Congress failed to act upon this bill, it is
likely that the Bill's reciprocity portion will be reintroduced in a later congressional ses-
sion. See supra note 33.
202. 124 CONG. REc. S. 1191 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1978) (Remarks of Mr. DeConcini).
203. See supra notes 113, 120, 138-40, 150, 170-174 and accompanying text.
204. KINTNER & JOELSON, sulra note 9, at 1.
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the "Agreed Rules and Principles" formulated by the UNCRBP.20 5
While a relatively large number of countries could satisfy the
"type or category" requirement under this reciprocity formulation,
many of these countries would fail to satisfy the second requirement
that this standard imposes. To acquire standing under a "general
reciprocity" standard, a foreign country must provide standing in its
courts for United States Government suits concerning antitrust vio-
lations. Only fifteen countries2°6 presently provide for such stand-
ing. Thus, any standard imposing such a "standing" requirement
would exclude most nations of the world. If the "general reciproc-
ity" standard were modified by eliminating the "standing" require-
ment, the right to bring antitrust suits in the United States would be
extended to at least thirty-five nations. Countries without any anti-
trust law, however, still would be denied standing in United States
courts.
C. STANDARD 3
The third proposed reciprocity formulation requires a foreign
government to demonstrate an intent or a trend, within that nation,
to promote free trade and competition. Adopting this standard
would extend standing even beyond the thirty-five nations that could
satisfy the "type or category" requirement of the "general reciproc-
ity" standard. India, for example, would be considered a country
which exhibits a trend toward developing antitrust laws analogous to
those of the United States.207
This formulation of reciprocity does not require a foreign
nation to develop a body of substantive law outlawing the types or
categories of conduct that are prohibited by the antitrust laws of the
United States. Under this reciprocity standard, a country must only
show either some rudiments of antitrust development or that some
other means are used to promote free trade and competition. The
enactment or even the consideration of initial antitrust legislation or
an executive or governmental statement of policy demonstrating
such an intent would satisfy the requirement. Many countries, how-
ever, have not demonstrated such a trend or intent.20 8 Thus, enact-
205. This code, by prohibiting similar antitrust violations, seems to embody many of
the basic concepts of United States antitrust law. See supra notes 182-87 and accompa-
nying text.
206. A survey of OECD countries indicates that only twelve of these countries provide
for a civil damages action for antitrust violations. See supra note 134 and accompanying
text. Four countries outside the OECD also recognize such a right of action. See supra
note 179.
207. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. Developing countries comprise the
majority of nations within this group.
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ing even this loose reciprocity standard would deny those countries
standing to sue in the courts of the United States.
D. STANDARD 4
The fourth proposed reciprocity formulation would grant stand-
ing to almost all foreign nations. To gain standing rights, a country
would have to demonstrate only that it applies its laws to the United
States in a nondiscriminatory manner.209 Thus, standing would be
the rule; the denial of standing would be the exception. Foreign
nondisclosure statutes offer an example of laws that result in dis-
criminatory treatment. Such statutes deny the courts of the United
States the opportunity to examine relevant foreign documents, 210
and thereby limit the ability of the courts to make informed deci-
sions. In 1980, the United Kingdom enacted its nondisclosure law
which clearly manifests its disapproval of United States antitrust
suits against British nationals. The statute prohibits English citizens
from complying with the requests of United States courts for docu-
ments sought in United States antitrust litigation. Further, the Act
allows English citizens who are defendants in an antitrust action in
the United States to recover two-thirds of any treble damages they
must pay.21'
This standard of reciprocity would grant standing rights to most
foreign nations, including many developing countries which cur-
rently have no antitrust laws.21 2 Although even this mild reciprocity
requirement would exclude some nations, including the United
209. Conversation with Mr. Joel Davidow, Director of Office of Policy Planning,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice (Feb. 10, 1981).
210. Oesterle, supra note 67, at 24. This is also a major issue in the recent uranium
cartel litigation. See generaly, Note, Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders
in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979). See also Stanford, The Application of the
Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL
INT'L LU. 195 (1978). France was the most recent addition to the list of at least twenty
countries that have promulgated statutes of this type.
211. Oesterle, supra note 67, at 24 n.105.
The U.K. law ... prohibit[s] citizens from complying with requests for docu-
ments situated in the United Kingdom if the legal proceeding in the United
States is concerned with possible violations of antitrust law. Furthermore, the
law establishes a cause of action in U.K. courts for nationals to recover two-
thirds of any treble damage award suffered at the hands of specified antitrust
plaintiffs in United States courts.
Id See The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, reprinted in 959 ANTrTRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-l-F-2 (April 10, 1980).
212. One commentator argues that such standing increases the bargaining position of
the less developed countries vis-a-vis the multinational corporations. He believes, there-
fore, that these nations "will be better able to deter anticompetitive practices." Note,
Antitrust: Standingfor Foreign Governments-Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 10 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 833, 836-837 (1978). Yet, standing rights alone will not be a panacea for
these countries. "The absence of an antitrust remedy is more likely than not a real prob-
lem for many of the [developing countries]. .. ." Id at 836.
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Kingdom, this standard is the only one of the proposed reciprocity
formulations that would not exclude a majority of countries from
access to United States courts to institute antitrust claims.
213
CONCLUSION
Policy considerations and the practical effects of imposing a rec-
iprocity standard indicate that foreign governments should continue
to have standing to sue for treble damages under section four of the
Clayton Act. No reciprocity requirement should be imposed to limit
this right.214 If Congress decides that a reciprocity requirement is
appropriate, it should attempt to perform a country-by-country anal-
ysis to determine which countries should be guaranteed standing
rights. Factors such as the relationship of the United States to a spe-
cific country, as well as that country's manifested commitment to
free trade, must be taken into account. This would give some assur-
ance that the policies underlying antitrust standing rights of foreign
nations would be considered. Further, a careful individual analysis
would avoid some of the negative repercussions in foreign relations
that imposing a strict reciprocity standard-would trigger.215 While
213. The first standard would exclude all nations; the second would grant standing to
approximately 15 nations; the third would grant standing to approximately 35 nations;
and the fourth would grant standing to all but a handful of nations.
Even assuming that a foreign government is granted standing, important questions
remain. Should a foreign nation be able to recover treble damages in an antitrust suit, or
should it be limited to recovering actual damages? Some of the same policies that sup-
port the grant of standing rights to foreign nations similarly support awarding treble
damages. See supra notes 37-104 and accompanying text. For example, the treble dam-
ages award would help effectuate the dual goals of the Clayton Act: compensation and
deterrence. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. One Antitrust Division official
recognizes the importance of a treble damage award ,as a deterrent to future antitrust
violations. "Experience suggests that the poibility of facing treble damage actions
brought by persons injured by antitrust violations weighs heavily on the mind of a poten-
tial price fixer." Ewing, The Clayton Act Amendments of.1978, DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTI-
TRUST DIVISION RELEASES 4 (Aug. 3, 1978); Parker, The Deterrent Effect ofPrvate Treble
Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy? 3 N.M.L. REv. 286 (1973).
The notion that a possible treble damage recovery maximizes the incentive to sue
underlies the private enforcement provisions of antitrust law in the United States. For an
interesting discussion of the economies of antitrust enforcement, see Schwartz, An Over-
view of The Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L. J. 1075 (1980). The incentive
provided by a possible treble damage recovery would assume even greater importance in
encouraging foreign governments to seek remedies for antitrust violations. The costs of
discovery and representation in such suits are likely to be prohibitive. Capital-poor
countries may be unable to meet such expenses. The difference between actual damage
and treble damage recovery would likely be an important factor in deciding whether to
bring suit.
214. Of course, the requirement that a foreign government be at peace with the United
States as well as recognized by the executive should be maintained. See supra notes 15-
18 and accompanying text.
215. Germany, for example, believes the United States must exercise greater care
before imposing strict statutory requirements. A German official stated: "We are con-
vinced that the sometimes frail framework of international law would be seriously
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individual determinations necessarily would be expensive and time-
consuming, the imposition of a uniform reciprocity requirement,
even in its mildest form, would result in the arbitrary denial of
standing rights to some nations, including some valuable trading
partners. Severe damage to United States foreign relations with the
excluded nations could be an unwelcome result of a uniform reci-
procity requirement.
Larry A. DiMatteo and Kenneth B. Furry
affected by a U.S.-legislative demand for conformity with U.S. statutes." S. REP. No.
239, supra note 38, at 72 (Letter from Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany).
This is especially significant because "Germany has the strongest and most energetically
enforced antitrust laws apart from the United States." Id.
